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ABSTRACT: The behavior of three markets with speculators is studied. 
Each market is for commodities that can be carried forward one period 
by two speculators. Demand in the first period is stationary from
year to year and demand in the second period is randomly determined. 
The question posed by the research is the reliability of rational ex­
pectations models relative to autarky models, in explaining market 
behavior, The result is that the rational expectations model is more
accurate. 
Speculation in markets presents some of the most interesting of 
scientific challenges. Almost all of the behavioral sciences can 
become involved in the analysis, as is clear from the major features 
of the phenomena. For example, individuals observe prices and the 
choice behavior of other individuals and appear to form assessments 
about the course of coming events. Economic analysts tend to model 
this process of assessment formation as subjective probability 
formation and apply Bayes law to capture the essence of the process. 
However, learning and expectations formation are studied in other 
disciplines, so the economic models necessarily inherit the criticisms 
of Bayes law held by behaviorists from other fields. In addition, the 
assessments result in decisions; and the most tractable model of the 
decision process, and thus the model used by economic analysts, 
involves an application of the expected utility hypothesis which is 
frequently dismissed in related disciplines as having no behavioral 
content at all. The competition among speculators fosters a 
simultaneous interaction of decisions that might be captured by the 
law of supply and demand. In the case of speculation, however, models 
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of the supply and demand process are difficult to close and solve 
unless one postulates that the law of supply and demand operates in a 
manner consistent with speculators' expectations, This latter 
feature, which is added by the application of the principle of 
rational expectations, operates as though the individuals are able to 
individually solve the system by application of the law, Substantial 
dimensions of controversy are added because speculators are not 
ordinarily trained as economists, cannot articulate such a law, and 
for the most part even seem to be unaware that such a law might be 
operative, So, many would claim without reservation that the theory 
is worthless, 
In this paper the behavior of three experimental markets with 
speculators is reported. The objective of the study is to determine 
whether the abstract rational expectations models are reliable at all 
in economic environments more complicated than those previously 
studied and, if so, to what degree, Speculation over time under 
conditions of stationary demand has been studied by MILLER/ PLOTT/ 
SMITH (1977); HOFFMAN/PLOTT (1981); PLOTT/ UHL (1981)1 FORSYTHE/ 
PALFREY/ PLOTT (1982); WILLIAMS (1979); and SMITH/ WILLIAMS (1982), 
Speculation with uncertainty is studied in PLOTT/ SUNDER (1982). The 
markets studied in this paper involved uncertainty and time, 
simultaneously, which had only been studied separately in previous 
experiments. The uncertainty involves a degree of complexity beyond 
that studied in Plott and Sunder. The demand functions are not 
perfectly elastic as they were in the Plott and Sunder experiments, 
If demands are not perfectly elastic, prices are generally sensitive 
to small changes in supply and their information content can thereby 
be "contaminated. " 
The parameters and experimental design are outlined in the next 
section. The structure of applicable models is outlined in the third 
section, The data are reviewed in the fourth, and the conclusions are 
presented in the last section. As it turns out, the models still 
perform with substantial accuracy even in the more complicated 
environment. 
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND PARAMETERS 
Three experiments were conducted. Subjects were recruited from 
California Institute of Technology (CIT), University of Southern 
California (USC), and University of California at Los Angeles (UCLA), 
and had no previous experience in experimental markets. Each 
experiment lasted approximately three hours including instructions and 
training with the random process used to determine demand. 
The general format was the same as that introduced by MILLER/ 
PLOTT/ SMITH (1977), The market consisted of a series of years, each 
of which had two periods (blue and yellow). Two traders had the 
capacity to purchase units in the blue period and carry them forward 
to the yellow period in hope of selling them at a prof it, No other 
agent had this capacity. Units could not be carried forward by other 
agents, and the traders could only carry forward from the blue period 
to the yellow period of a given year. Inventories could not be held 
between years. It was as though the product could be produced in both 
the blue and yellow periods but would spoil after the yellow period. 
Thus the traders had a special role within these special markets. 
The markets were organized as oral double auctions. Buyers and 
sellers respectively tendered bids and offers orally to an auctioneer, 
Only the best bid or offer remained open. Thus all bids, offers, and 
contracts were observed by all participants. See PLOTT (forthcoming) 
for details of this form of market organization. 
Individual redemption values and costs are given in Table 1. 
TABLE 1: Individual Redemption Values and Costs* 
X Demand Functions z Demand Functions Cost 
1st 2nd 3rd 1st 2nd 3rd Seller 1st 2nd 3rd Buyer unit unit unit unit unit unit unit unit unit 
2 5. 40 3,00 2.40 7. 20 7. 00 5. 00 1 4. 60 6. 60 7.00
4 5. 60 4.60 3. 20 7. 20 6. 40 6.20 3 5. 60 5. 80 7. 20 
6 5.20 4.40 2.80 7. 20 6,80 4. 80 5 4. 80 6. 80 8,00 
8 5,80 4.20 3 . 40 7. 20 6. 00 5. 40 7 5. 40 6. 00 7. 80 
10 4. 80 4. 00 2. 60 7. 20 6,60 5,20 9 5. 00 6. 40 7. 60 
12 5.00 3. 80 3,60 7. 20 5. 80 5. 60 11 5. 20 6. 20 7. 40 
*The two traders had no exogenously imposed redemption values or costs. 
These aggregate to the demand and supply functions shown in Figure 1. 
Neglecting units possibly carried forward, the supply function was the 
same in both the blue period and the yellow period of any given year, 
and it was also constant across years. Demand in the blue period was 
as shown in the figure and it was constant across the blue period of 
all years. Demand in the yellow period was determined by a random 
variable. With probability equal to one-third the demand function is 
the one labeled X in the figure and, with probability two-thirds, is 
the one labeled z. That is, with one-third probability the demand was 
constant between the blue nnd yellow periods, and with two-thirds 
probability the demand incrensed in the yellow period. Of course, 
speculative activity by traders will alter the effective demand in the 
blue period and supply in the yellow. 
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MARKET DEMANDS, MARKET SUPPLY 
AND THE RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS 
MODEL 
During the markets the random mechanism used to determine the 
demand in the yellow period was a bingo cage, Prior to the beginning 
of the market, subjects observed from 100 to 150 draws from the bingo 
cage, which had 36 balls numbered from one to thirty-six. If a ball 
numbered from one to twelve was drawn the event was X and otherwise it 
was z. The probabilistic model, prob (X) 1/3, prob (Z) = 2/3, 
accurately modeled the proportion of X and Z draws in all 
demonstrations. The draws made prior to the beginning of each yellow 
period were from the same cage used in the demonstration and the 
event, X or z, was publicly announced. 
MODELS /\ND HYPOTHESES 
Since the underlying random event is publicly announced, the 
application of the rational expectations model is the same as a 
Walrasian model in which no learning from prices exists. The model is 
described by the following equations. 
(1) 
( 2) 
(3) 
DX (PB) + T = S (PB) 
Ds (Py (s)) = S (Py (s)) + T, s E (X, Z}
PB = prob (X)Py (X) + prob (Z)Py (Z) 
carry-forward 
price in blue period 
price in yellow period 
s state 
demand function in state s 
supply function 
Equations (1) and (2) are statements of tne law of supply and demand 
for a given level of speculative activity T, Equation (2) also ack­
nowledges that the price in the yellow period is dependent on the out­
come of the random event which determines the value of the random 
variable s. Equation (3) is the rational expectations principle. 
Traders, in the absence of risk aversion, will adjust carry-forward to 
the point at which expected profits are zero. 
If prob (X) and prob (Z) are assumed to be 1/3 and 2/3, then the 
solution to these equations for the parameters of the experiment is: 
5.60 {4.80 if s Py (S) = 6,00 if S x z 
T 4 
Implicit in the above model is a concept of temporary or short­
run equilibria, Equations (1) and (2) for a fixed level of carry­
forward determine market prices, Implicitly these equations also 
define a concept of temporary efficiency. According to the general 
model these prices will have a predictable influence on the carry­
forward, and the carry-forward will have an influence on prices from 
those that would exist without carry-forward. 
The null hypothesis is that speculation is ineffective. The 
formal description is derived from equations (1) and (2) and the 
assumption T = O. Price predictions in the null hypothesis are: 
PB = 5,20, Py (X) = 5.20, Py (Z) = 6,40.
Equations one through three 
price and quantity, about the 
have implications in addition to 
efficiency with which the systems 
operate. The efficiency of a market reflects the degree to which the 
process exhausts the gains from exchange. If the traditional concepts 
of consumer and producer surplus are applied as measures of the gains 
from exchange and if no risk aversion is present, then the system 
operates at 100 percent efficiency if the expected earnings of all 
participants are at a maximum, Formally, the expression for expected 
f-i1rninqs at 100 perc(•nt efficiency is: 
( 4)
Xy (s) }] � S (x)dx , s f [X, Z}, 
The first order conditions to (4) can be interpreted as equations (1), 
(2), and (3) above. So system efficiency can be viewed as a measure 
of the success of the rational expectations model. Since the demand 
and supply functions D (') and S (') are accessible as the redemption 
schedules and cost schedules, respectively, maximum efficiency for the 
system is equivalent to maximum total earnings of agents. 
In markets without uncertainty the efficiency measurements are 
easily computed, The introduction of random variables complicates 
matters unless many markets and market years are available. The 
actual earnings of individuals depend upon the realization of the 
random event, so ex ante "poor" decisions may be very profitable ex 
post. Some problems of this nature can be avoided by an application 
of partial equilibrium analysis as opposed to the general equilibrium 
analysis implicit in (4). Some measures which reflect these problems 
will be introduced below in the results section. 
RESULTS 
The time series of all transactions of all periods for all three 
experiments are in Figures 2, 3, and 4, Contract prices are shown in 
the order in which they occurred, Shown in the figures are also the 
number of units carried forward. Table 2 provides average price data 
for all periods of all experiments. These are listed along. with the 
predictions of the model, given the outcome of the random process, and 
(i) given the actual carry-forward, (ii) the autarky prices of zero 
carry-forward, and (iii) rational expectations prices of the optimal 
carry-forward of four units, The values of (iii) are shown as dashed 
lines in the figures, The values of (i) and (ii) were not graphed 
because the resulting figures would be too cluttered. 
RESULT 1: The null model is rejected along all dimensions in favor of 
the rational expectations model. 
Carry-forward except period 1 of the UCLA market is always above 
zero. The likelihoods of the data, given the model, are in Table 3 
for the last periods of occurrence for each state for each market, In 
the last periods of two of the three experiments PB is (significantly) 
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closer to 5,60 than to 5.20 and in the remaining UCLA market the 
models were tied. Prices in the last yellow period for which z 
occurred are never closPr to the null hypothe si s than to the rational 
expectations predictions. When the event is x, the rational 
expectations model is better in the CIT ma rket and autarky is better 
in the UCLA marke t. The few times of an occ urre n ce of X in the UCLA 
FIGURE 4 TIME SERIES OF CONTRACT PRICES, SPECULATION 
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market probably accounts for ,this latter statistic because markets 
take time to adjust. In both the CIT and USC markets the rational ex­
pectations model is a better predictor than the autarky model in al­
most all periods. In the UCLA market the two models are about tied if 
number of periods is the measure. 
TABLE 2: Average Prices and Predicted Prices ---------------------
Average 
Given CF
A utarky 
4-Unit CF 
Average 
Given CF
Autarky 
4-Unit CF 
J\vcraCJe 
GivC'n CF 
Autarky 
4-Unit Cl' 
a. California Institute of Technology 
Market Year and Period 
lB lY 
5.34 6.45 
5.40 6.20 
5.20 6.40 
5,60 6.00 
4B 4Y 
5.43 6.05 
5.60 6.00 
5.20 6.40 
5.60 6.00 
7H 7Y 
5.56 
5.70±.10 
5.20 
S.60 
4.99 
4.70±.10 
5.20 
4.80 
2B 2Y 
5.35 6 .ll 
5,50±.10 6 .10±.10 
5.20 6.40 
5.60 6.00 
5B 5Y 
5.44 6.05 
5.60 6.00 
5.20 6.40 
5.60 6.00 
BB BY 
5.52 5.87 
5.60 6.00 
5.20 6 .40 
5.60 6,00 
3B 
5 :33 
5,50±.10 
5.20 
5.60 
6B 
5,53 
5.70±.10 
5.20 
5 .60 
9B 
5.54 
5.50±.10 
5,20 
5.60 
-----------�- ---------------- -----
3Y 
6.09 
6.10±.10 
6.40 
6.00 
6Y 
5.92 
5.90±.10 
6.40 
6.00 
9Y 
5.86 
6 ,10±.10 
6.40 
6.00 
TABLE 2 (continued) 
b. University of Southern California 
Average 
Given CF 
Autarky 
4-Unit CF
Average 
Given CF 
Autarky 
4-Unit CF
Average 
Given CF 
Autarky 
4-Unit C F
lB 
5, B7
5. BO 
5. 20 
5.60
48 
5, 6B 
5. 70±. 10 
5. 20 
5,60
7B 
5. 72 
5.70±.10
5, 20 
5.60
Market Year and Period 
lY 
6.09
5. BO 
6. 40 
6,00
4Y 
5. BB* 
5. 90±. 10 
6.40 
6.00
7Y 
5. B7 
5,90±.10
6. 40 
6.00
2B 
5. B9 
5. 70±. 10 
5. 20 
5,60
5B 
5. 74 
5.BO 
5.20
5.60
BB 
5.66 
5, 50±. 10 
5, 20 
5.60
2Y 
6 , 06 
5.90±.10
6. 40 
6. 00 
5Y 
5. 83
5.BO
6. 40 
6. 00 
BY 
5. 92 
6 . 10±. 10
6. 40 
6, 00 
3B 3Y 
5. 72 
5, 90±. 10 
5, 20 
5, 60
68 
5. 74 
5. 70±. 10 
5. 20 
5, 60
9B 
5, 87 
5. 70±. 10 
6. 40 
6. 00 
6Y 
5. 85 
5. 90±. 10 
6. 40 
6. 00 
9Y 
c, University of California at Los Angeles 
Average 
Given CF 
Autarky 
4-Unit C F
Average 
Given CF 
Autarky 
4-Unit CF
Average 
Given CF 
Autarky 
4-Unit CF
lB 
5.25
5,20
5. 20
5, 60 
4B 
5. 37
5.40 
5. 20 
5. 60 
7B 
5, 38 
5. 50±. 10 
5. 20 
5,60
lY 
6, 16 
6.40
6.40
6, 00 
4Y 
6. 39
6. 20 
6. 40
6, 00 
7Y 
6. 21 
6, 10±. 10 
6,40 
6.00
*Trader failed to sell a unit, 
2B 
5 ,39
5.40
5. 20
5. 60 
5B 
5. 41
5.60
5. 20 
5 . 60 
BB 
5. 41 
5, 40 
5. 20 
5. 60 
2Y 
6 . 4  8 
6. 20 
6. 40
6, 00 
SY 
5 . 18* 
4, 80 
5, 20 
4, 80 
8Y 
6. 22 
6. 20
6, 40
6.00
3B 
5. 58 
5. 70±. 10
5. 20 
5,60
6B 
5.35 
5. 60 
5. 20 
5.60
9B 
5, 40 
5, 50±. 10 
5. 20 
5. 60
3Y 
4. 97 
4. 70±. 10 
s. 20 
4. 80 
6Y 
5. 20 
4. 80 
5. 20 
4, 80 
9Y 
6. 17 
6 . 10±. 10 
6. 40 
6. 00 
Note: CF = carry-forward 
The next result is typical of experimental economics. The 
variance of the prices in the final periods is so low that the 
predictions of any model taken as the null hypothesis tested against 
the composite alternative of any other point, will be rejected. 
Nevertheless the results should be r epo rted for completeness. 
TABLE 3: Likelihoods of Sample Which Gives Rational Expectations and 
Autarky Calculated for Last Periods of Each state and Each 
Market 
Blue 
Yellow (Z) 
Yellow (Y) 
CIT 
3.4 x 1040 
more than lOlOO 
1.1 7 
The numbers are the ratios a/b: 
-n/2 1 n 2 a =  (211) exp[ (--2) I (p · - s1) l 2o i=l 1 
n =sample size 
a2 = sample variance 
Pi = individual prices in sample 
use 
1.1 x 1014 
2.4 x 1022 
X never occurred 
UCLA 
1 
6.3 x 1023 
5.84 x 10-4 
b = (211)-n/2exp [ (-�) I ( p. - s2)2J 2o i=l 1 
s = predicted price by: 
(s1) rational expectations model 
( s2) au tarky model 
RESULT 2: The null hypothesis that the prices are equal to the ra­
tional expectations price can be rejected if tested against the compo­
site alternative hypothesis of all other prices. 
In the last periods t-tests were performed, The null hypothesis 
that prices were those predicted by the rational expectations model is 
always rejected at the . 01 level of significance, 
The temporary equilibrium model, equations (1) and (2), 
parameterized for the actual carry-forward is remarkably accurate, 
This suggests that the law of demand and supply is operative and that 
part of the error of the rational expectations model develops because 
the carry-forward is short of the predicted quantity, On average in 
the last two years of all experiments, three units carry forward 
rather than the predicted four units. 
RESULT 3: 
temporary 
The null hypothesis, 
equilibrium, can be 
that last-period prices are at a 
rejected in only a few of the yellow 
periods. In all other periods it cannot be rejected. 
In Table 4 the t ratios are given for all periods, As can be 
seen, the hypothesis can be rejected at the . 01 level in only a few 
periods, In addition, in some periods there is no error at all in the 
temporary equilibrium model. 
The final observation is related to equation (3) and the implied 
subjective probability of event X being one-third. The motivation of 
the model is that subjective expected value of prices in period yellow 
should equal those in period blue. If we assume that ex post 
frequencies equal subjective probabilities, then we get the following 
result. 
TABLE 4: Partial Equilibrium t-Statistics for All Periods 
of All Experiments 
Group Periods t B n t 
1 l,0154 4 2.4398 
2 O.Bl65 5 0 
3 l,6059 5 0 
4 3 ,5603* 6 0, 93 Bl 
CIT 5 3.2637 6 l.01B7 
6 2.5560 6 0 
7 1.8926 6 1.3621 
B 4,0000* 5 7.712B* 
9 0 5 7.7B21* 
1 0, 3 4 Bl 6 2.2170 
2 0,5634 B 0,7099 
3 1.0124 8 0.7212 
4 0 6 0 
5 7.1714* 6 0,9589 USC 
6 0 6 0 
7 0 6 0 
8 1.0153 4 1.7148 
1 0. 4 80 4 3 1.5269 
2 0. 2182 5 7 .3251* 
3 0,5258 6 0.7412 
4 0. 5571 5 2.4000 
UCLA 5 19,0000* 5 3.9726* 
6 9.0094* 5 3.B579* 
7 0. 7 94 7 4 0.1723 
8 0,5345 5 1.0000 
9 0 5 0 
*Would reject at better than 0.01. 
y n 
-- ---
10 
12 
11 
12 
11 
10 
7 
12 
11 
13 
11 
13 
13 
13 
12 
12 
12 
9 
10 
7 
10 
5 
5 
11 
10 
11 
RESULT 4: Prices weighted by ex post relative frequencies do not 
satisfy the rational expectations equation (3), 
With only three observations, statistics make no sense; but the 
three data points we have support the conclusion. The average across 
periods of average blue-period prices and the average across periods 
of average yellow-period prices are reported for each market in the 
following two-tuples: for CIT (5.45,5.93); for USC (5,75,5.87); for 
UCLA (5,39,5.79). In all cases the expected value as reflected by 
observed frequencies indicates that prices are higher in the yellow 
period than in the blue period, 
Experiences with the behavior of experimental markets would lead 
to caution in accepting the above analysis as evidence in support of a 
rejection of the rational expectations model. Markets take time to 
adjust and the reported averages involve periods of disequilibrium 
prices, Exactly how such disequi libria are reflc·cted in the averaCjes 
is not clear. It is interesting to note, however, that the event X 
never occurred in the eight periods at USC. The market adjustment is 
very close to what would be expected if prob (X) = 0, The prediction 
is P8 = Py = 5.80 and carry-forward should equal f ive units. Notice 
that in periods 5, 6, and 7 the data conform almost exactly to this 
predict ion, 
The second qualification turns on concepts of risk aversion. If 
risk aversion is present, only three units or less should be carried 
forward, The prices should then be those d ictated by a carry-forward 
of three units, 
RESULT 5: The carry-forward behavior of all markets is consistent 
with risk aversion, 
In the f inal 
forward. Thus, 
year of all markets, three units are carried 
the negative implications of Conclusion 4 � simply 
reflect risk aversion, Future experiments could control for this 
hypothesis by building in some profit given the predicted carry­
forward, 
Efficiency numbers are in Table 51 but these are not d irect 
derivations from (4). The experiment at USC provides an interesting 
example inherent in the application of a stochastic general 
equilibrium measure like (4) to evaluate the performance of only a few 
market periods, In the USC market the bad (X) state never occurred. 
Carry-forward was substantial and 
carried forward if the prob (Z) = l, 
approximated that which would be 
Since z always occurred, the 
earnings were above expectations, given other aspects of the market 
performance, The four measures below are attempts to cope with the 
problem. 
The decisions of speculators are not the only determ inant of 
market efficiency. Learning and market d isequilibria can both affect 
efficiency and both of these are sensitive to the interactions between 
the blue and yellow markets. The two measures developed below reflect 
the behavior of a single (partial) market, parameterized as a partial 
equil ibrium, to minimize the influence of the other market. The 
measures also reflect the information at the time of decision. 
(5) Partial market efficiency (blue) - PME8 (T) = 
V(T) 
[earnings from b�ue period] + V ( ) T  _ [cost of blue.period]consumption T production 
max (
X 8
o8 (x) dx - (
XB+T
S (x) dx 
xB Jo Jo 
+ V (T) T 
approximated m in imum value necessary to carry rorwarct T units, 
T units actually carried forward. 
TABLE 5: Market Efficiency ('/,) 
CIT use UCLA 
Partial General Carry Partial General Carry Partial General Carry Market Efficiency Market Efficiency Market Efficiency 
Efficiency 1 2 
Forward Efficiency 1 2 
Forward Efficiency 1 2 
Forward 
1 B 62 70 88 ( 1, 1) 
71 96 92 ( 5, 1) 
92 
39 75 (0,0) y 99 98 88 
2 
B 93 86 95 ( 1, 2) 
90 96 93 (2, 3) 
100 73 94 (1, 1) y 99 96 100 
3 
B 93 87 97 (2, 1) 
96 94 85 (2, 5) 
100 98.7 63* ( 3, 2) y 100 94 99 
B 100 100 100 ( 1, 3) 
62 85 66 ( 3, 2) 
92 73 93 (2,0) y 100 87 100 
5 
B 94 99 99 ( 1, 3) 
100 99 99 ( 4, 2) 
100 83 -36 * (2, 2) y 99 99 78 
6 B 100 91 81 ( 1, 4) 100 83 61 ( 3, 2) 
100 100 100 * (2,2) y 90 82 100 
7 B 100 99 69 * (2, 3) 
100 99.6 99 (5,0) 
93 87 97 (1,2) y 99 99.6 100 
8 B 100 100 100 (1, 3) 
93 85 95 ( 3, 0) 
100 73 94 (0, 2) y 100 99 100 
9 B 100 84 91 ( 2, 1) 
100 87 98 (1,2) y 96 100 
*The low demand event, x, occurred. 
The numerator is consumer plus producer surplus that actually resulted 
in the blue period when the price of the carry-forward is 
approximately the minimum constant price which would induce that 
carry-forward, The denominator is the maximum that the total value of 
earnings could be, given the carry-forward. 
(6) Partial market efficiency (yellow) = PMEy(T) -
[earnings from ye�low period] - r yellow period Jconsumption production costs 
max 
Xy(s)
SE [X, Z] 
Definition (6) is similar to (5) with one major exception. The 
realization of the random variable is known before period yellow 
begins, so the efficiency of the system reflects the outcome. The 
opportunity cost of units carried forward is zero so the consumption 
of these units contributes to utility (earnings) but not costs. The 
denominator is the maximum earnings that can occur, given carry­
forward and the outcome of random event. 
The final measure is an attempt to combine the two ex post, 
partial measures in (5) and (6) into an ex post general equilibrium 
measure consistent with the essence of (4). 
(7) General efficiency1 = GE1(s,T) = 
[earnings from] .·. A [cost of blue] [earnings from] [cost of yellow]
blue period +V•T - period + yellow period - period 
consumption production consumption production 
f XB (XB+T "
 Jx�
(s,T
A
)+T
A 
r x
e(s,T
A) 
J
o o8(x)dx - J
0 
S(x)dx + VT )
0 
Ds(x)dx-J
0 
S(x)dx 
v expected price in yellow period, given an optimal carry­
forward as calculated from (4), 
optimal values calculated from (4), 
X�1'I'/\ = actual value observed. 
The measure has aspects of double counting, depending upon the 
philosophy of time that one wishes to apply. The quantity v ' �·
A 
in 
the numerator is in a sense the "utility" obtained by traders in 
period blue from the purchase of a lottery, This value is added tu 
the consumers' surplus from period blue consumption, Yellow period 
consumption actually involves the realization of the lottery with no 
subtractions or "loss" for the occurrence of the unfortunate event. 
One could argue that the units are not comparable, An alternative and 
very reasonable measure is (B) with V ' TA removed from the numerator 
and VT removed from the denominator, and the carry-forward in the 
denominator postulated to be the optimum. Of course if the carry­
forward is greater than the optimum and the good state occurs, this 
measure of efficiency can exceed 100 percent. 
(B) General efficiency2 = GE2(s,T) = 
[earnings from] [cost o� blue] [earnings f:om� [cost of 
.
yellow]
blue period - period + yellow period - period 
consumption production consumption production 
. ( x�+T (x� 
+J
0 
os (x)dx -J
0 
s (x)dx
RESULT 6: Neither the presence of randomness nor the existence of 
speculators decreases partial market efficiency. The existence of 
speculators increases general market efficiency. 
Both the blue and yellow partial market efficiencies grow to 
nearly 100 percent as the number of periods increases. These measures 
are typical of markets which are converging to an equilibrium. As the 
markets adjust and agents acquire familiarity with the prices and 
trading technology, the markets tend to exhaust the (temporary) gains 
from exchange. The general market efficiency numbers are more 
difficult to evaluate. These numbers tend to exceed the autarky 
efficiency of 75 percent. Unfortunately, in these data we do not have 
a frequent occurrence of the low demand event and on two occasions, a 
trader failed to resell a unit, thereby substantially reducing 
efficiency. Nevertheless, both efficiency measures reflect the 
improved efficiency due to speculators. GE1 tends to be relatively 
(to GE2) sensitive to carry-forward and will fall substantially as the 
carry-forward deviates from the theoretical optimum of four units. 
Even with this sensitive measure, efficiency tends to exceed autarky 
expectations. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The rational expectations model is more accurate than the autarky 
model. Even though the model has errors when applied without 
adjustment or risk aversion, no alternative model does so well in 
explaining the behavior of these markets. Certainly in view of the 
controversy about the component theoretical parts of the model, the 
use of Bayes law, the expected utility hypothesis, the principle o[ 
rational expectations, and the like, the model is surprisingly 
accurate. In this latter respect the data from these markets should 
be added to the data generated from the behavior of less complicated 
markets in providing support for the rational expectations class of 
models over the current set of alternative models. 
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